The Occupation of Maritime Territory
under International Humanitarian Law
Marco Longobardo

95 INT’L L. STUD. 322 (2019)

Volume 95

2019

Published by the Stockton Center for International Law
ISSN 2375-2831

International Law Studies

2019

The Occupation of Maritime Territory
under International Humanitarian Law
Marco Longobardo
CONTENTS
I.
Introduction ............................................................................................. 323
II. The Territorial Dimension of the Law of Occupation ..................... 325
III. The Scope of “Occupied Territory” under Article 42 of the 1907
Hague Regulations and the Sea ............................................................ 327
IV. Requirements to Consider Portions of the Sea Occupied Territory .. 340
V. Which Portions of the Sea Can Be Occupied Territory? .................. 345
VI. The Potential and Limits of the Law of Occupation at Sea ............. 350
VII. The Interplay between the Law of Occupation and the Law of
Naval Warfare ......................................................................................... 355
VIII. Conclusion ............................................................................................... 360

 Lecturer in International Law, University of Westminster. Author email: m.longobardo1@westminster.ac.uk. The author wishes to thank Steven Haines and Federica Violi
for their comments on previous drafts.
The thoughts and opinions expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those
of the U.S. government, the U.S. Department of the Navy, or the U.S. Naval War College.
322

The Occupation of Maritime Territory

I.

Vol. 95

INTRODUCTION

T
O
W
I

his article addresses the largely underexplored issue of the occupation of
maritime territory during armed conflict.1 By definition, situations of occupation are created by the occupying power exercising actual authority over a
portion of territory outside its borders without the consent of the sovereign.2
However, there are several issues related to armed conflict at sea that should
be addressed within the legal framework offered by the law of occupation.
This article is particularly topical because most situations of occupation
in recent times have concerned territories with access to the sea. On some
occasions, the coastal and maritime dimension of the occupied territory has
been at the center of debate concerning the lawfulness of the conduct of the
occupying power. For instance, much attention has been devoted to the lawfulness of the naval control exercised by Israel over portions of the waters
off the coast of the Gaza Strip.3 In addition, the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) has addressed the exploitation of natural resources in
1. To the best knowledge of this author, the only scholarly work published on this topic
is the very recent contribution by Tassilo Singer. See Tassilo Singer, Occupation of Sea Territory:
Requirements for Military Authority and Comparison to Art. 43 of the Hague Convention IV, in OPERATIONAL LAW IN INTERNATIONAL STRAITS AND CURRENT MARITIME SECURITY CHALLENGES 255 (Jörg Schildknecht, Rebecca Dickey, Martin Fink & Lisa Ferris eds., 2018). The
title of an old monograph by Cansacchi on the occupation of sea is misleading since the
book focuses on peacetime delimitation of territorial sea rather than on occupation during
armed conflict. See GIORGIO CANSACCHI, L’OCCUPAZIONE DEI MARI COSTIERI: CRITICA
DI UNA DOTTRINA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE (1936).
2. See infra Part II.
3. See infra notes 74–84, 181–85 and accompanying text. For the purposes of this article,
the Gaza Strip is considered to be under occupation notwithstanding the withdrawal of the
Israeli troops in 2005. This conclusion has been challenged. See, e.g., HCJ 9132/07 Bassiouni
v. Prime Minister, ¶ 12 (2008) (Isr.) (unpublished) (concluding that since its withdrawal in
2005 “the State of Israel bears no general obligation to concern itself with the welfare of the
residents of the Strip or to maintain public order within the Gaza Strip, according to the
international law of occupation.); Hanne Cuyckens, Is Israel Still an Occupying Power in Gaza?,
63 NETHERLANDS INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 275 (2016). However, most international
institutions consider the Gaza Strip to be an area under an ongoing occupation. See, e.g., S.C.
Res. 1860, pmbl. (Jan. 8, 2009); G.A. Res. 64/94, ¶ 4 (Jan. 19, 2010); Report of the United
Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict: Human Rights in Palestine and Other
Occupied Arab Territories, ¶¶ 273–79, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (Sept. 25, 2009); Report
of the International Fact-Finding Mission to Investigate Violations of International Law,
Including International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, Resulting from the Israeli
Attacks on the Flotilla of Ships Carrying Humanitarian Assistance, ¶¶ 63–66, U.N. Doc.
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the seas off the Western Sahara coast.4 Finally, the law of occupation may
play a role in the exploitation of the maritime natural resources of Northern
Cyprus, which has been under Turkish occupation since 1974.5
To address legal concerns arising from these and other cases of occupation, this article first provides a brief overview of the traditional territorial
dimension of the law of occupation. It then explores whether State practice
has extended the definition of “occupied territory” to encompass maritime
territory and if so, the areas to which it would apply. The article analyses
under what conditions maritime territory can be considered to be under occupation and concludes with an assessment of the relationship between the
law of occupation and other rules of international humanitarian law applicable to armed conflict at sea.

A/HRC/15/21 (Sept. 27, 2010); Report of the Detailed Findings of the Commission of
Inquiry on the 2014 Gaza Conflict, ¶¶ 26–31, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/29/CRP.4 (June 24,
2015); Report of the Detailed Findings of the Independent International Commission of
Inquiry on the Protests in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ¶¶ 61–67, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/40/CRP.2 (March 18, 2019); Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal
Court, Situation on Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia: Article 53(1)
Report, ¶¶ 27–29 (Nov. 6, 2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-COM-Article_53(1)-Report-06Nov2014Eng.pdf; see also Peter Maurer, Challenges to International Humanitarian Law: Israel’s Occupation Policy, 94 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 1504,
1506 (2012). Today, most authors consider the Gaza Strip to be under occupation since
Israel still exercises actual authority on the area thanks to its control over the borders, airspace, and sea. See MARCO LONGOBARDO, THE USE OF ARMED FORCE IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY 36–38 (2018).
4. See Case T-512/12, Front Polisario v. Council, 2015, ECLI:EU:T:2015:953 (Dec. 10,
2015); Case C-104/16 P, Council v. Front Polisario, 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:973 (Dec. 21,
2016); Case C-266/16, Western Sahara Campaign UK v. Commissioners, 2018,
ECLI:EU:C:2018:118 (Feb. 27, 2018). For more on this issue, see infra notes 174–80 and
accompanying text.
5. On the occupied status of Northern Cyprus, see, for example, S.C. Res. 541, ¶ 2
(Nov. 18, 1982); S.C. Res. 550 (May 11, 1984); Loizidou v. Turkey, 1996-IV Eur. Ct. H.R.
2216, ¶ 56; Cyprus v. Turkey, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, ¶ 77; see also EYAL BENVENISTI, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 188–94 (2d ed. 2012); MARIA CHIARA VITUCCI,
SOVRANITÀ E AMMINISTRAZIONI TERRITORIALI 63–76 (2012).
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THE TERRITORIAL DIMENSION OF THE LAW OF OCCUPATION

The law of occupation focuses on “territory” in defining occupation and the
powers and duties of occupying powers.6 The expression “occupation” refers to two different concepts that are distinct, albeit interrelated, in international humanitarian law. Occupation may refer both to a situation, a historical
fact that exists in reality,7 as well as to a legal regime, often labeled as the “law
of occupation,” which is applicable when there is a situation of occupation.8
The situation of occupation must be assessed based on the relevant facts.
The existence of the necessary factual conditions alone triggers the application of the law of occupation,9 no proclamation nor acknowledgment of occupation is required of the belligerents.10
The factual situation giving rise to occupation is defined in Article 42 of
the 1907 Hague Regulations, according to which “[t]erritory is considered
occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.
The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been
established and can be exercised.”11 Scholars have written extensively on this

6. See Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land § III, Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]; Convention (IV) Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War § III, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV].
7. This aspect is explored in LONGOBARDO, supra note 3, at 28–43; see also VAIOS KOUTROULIS, LE DÉBUT ET LA FIN DE L’APPLICATION DU DROIT DE L’OCCUPATION (2010);
Marco Sassòli, The Concept and the Beginning of the Occupation, in THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY 1389 (Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta & Marco Sassòli eds., 2015).
8. LONGOBARDO, supra note 3, at 43–61. In addition, on the law of occupation, see
ROBERT KOLB & SYLVAIN VITÉ, LE DROIT DE L’OCCUPATION MILITAIRE: PERSPECTIVES
HISTORIQUES ET ENJEUX JURIDIQUES ACTUELS (2009); ALESSANDRA ANNONI, L’OCCUPAZIONE OSTILE NEL DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE (2012); BENVENISTI, supra note 5; AEYAL
GROSS, THE WRITING ON THE WALL (2017); HANNE CUYCKENS, REVISITING THE LAW OF
OCCUPATION (2018); YORAM DINSTEIN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BELLIGERENT
OCCUPATION (2d ed. 2019).
9. See Christopher Greenwood, The Administration of Occupied Territory in International Law,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 241, 250
(Emma Playfair ed., 1992).
10. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF
WAR MANUAL § 11.2.4 (rev. ed., 2016) [hereinafter U.S. LAW OF WAR MANUAL].
11. Hague Regulations, supra note 6, art. 42.
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definition,12 which reflects customary international law.13 In particular, a significant debate concerns the meaning of the expression “actual authority,”
one of the factual requirements for the existence of a situation of occupation
and, thus, for triggering the application of the law of occupation. The other
two factual requirements are the existence of armed conflict and that the
occupying power exercises actual authority without a valid legal title.14
Article 42 is based on territorial considerations. Its first sentence restricts
occupation to territory alone, thus defining the spatial scope of a situation of
occupation. Its second sentence reinforces this restriction by limiting occupation to a specific territory. Accordingly, no scholar has ever challenged the
territorial dimension of the definition of occupation. Indeed, the territorial
dimension is central in the law of occupation, and it is impossible to envisage
a “deterritorialized” law of occupation.15
Other rules of the Hague Regulations confirm the territorial dimension
of the law of occupation since they are expressly applicable to occupied territory. For instance, Article 44 prohibits the occupying power from
“forc[ing] the inhabitants of territory occupied by it to furnish information
about the army of the other belligerent, or about its means of defense.”16
Likewise, Article 45 makes it unlawful to “compel the inhabitants of occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile power.”17 Additional provisions

12. See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text.
13. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶ 79 (July 9) [hereinafter Wall Advisory
Opinion]; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda),
Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168, ¶ 172 (Dec. 19) [hereinafter Armed Activities]; see also U.S.
LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 10, § 11.2.2.
14. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, EXPERT MEETING: OCCUPATION AND OTHER FORMS OF ADMINISTRATION OF FOREIGN TERRITORY 17–23 (Tristan
Ferraro ed., 2012) [hereinafter ICRC, OCCUPATION AND OTHER FORMS OF ADMINISTRATION OF FOREIGN TERRITORY].
15. On the popular contemporary discourse regarding the progressive “deterritorialization” of international law, see Catherine Brölmann, Deterritorializing International Law: Moving
Away from the Divide between National and International Law, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE
DIVIDE BETWEEN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 84 (Janne E. Nijman & André
Nollkaemper eds., 2007); see also the essays collected in A LACKLAND LAW? TERRITORY,
EFFECTIVENESS AND JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL AND EU LAW (Adriana Di Stefano
ed., 2015).
16. Hague Regulations, supra note 6, art. 44 (emphasis added).
17. Id. art. 45 (emphasis added).
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make similar references concerning the collection of taxes and other monetary levies.18
The 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention restates the territorial dimension
of occupation, providing rules in Section III, which is entitled “occupied
territories.”19 Specific provisions prohibit the alteration of occupied territory
and provide for the rights of the local population pendente occupatione20 and of
aliens,21 and the regulation of deportations, transfers, and evacuations of civilians all make specific reference to territory.22
Other provisions of the law of occupation refer to “country” rather than
territory. For instance, the occupying power must respect the law in force in
the occupied country under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations23 and Article
52 requires that requisitions in kind and services shall be in proportion to
the resources of the country and must not result in the local population’s
participation in military operations against their own country.24 Finally, Article 55 protects public property in the occupied country.25 This difference in
terminology is not particularly meaningful and certainly does not change the
conclusion that the law of occupation applies to territory.
III. THE SCOPE OF “OCCUPIED TERRITORY” UNDER ARTICLE 42 OF THE
1907 HAGUE REGULATIONS AND THE SEA
The first issue to explore with regard to the relationship between the law of
occupation and the sea is whether it is possible to establish an occupation
over the latter. In case of a positive answer, the consequence would be the
applicability of a sophisticated body of rules to events occurring at sea during
armed conflict. In this regard, the key provision is Article 42 of the Hague
Regulations, which defines occupied territory. Since this provision contains
no reference to the sea, the issue of whether “territory,” which will generally
be referred to as “maritime territory,” encompasses maritime areas is addressed in this Part.26 Here, I conclude that Article 42 properly interpreted,
18. See id. arts. 48, 49 (noting that both articles refer to “occupied territory”).
19. GC IV, supra note 6, § III.
20. See id. art. 47.
21. See id. art. 48.
22. See id. art. 49.
23. Hague Regulations, supra note 6, art. 43.
24. Id. art. 52.
25. Id. art. 55.
26. On the technical notion of maritime territory, see DICTIONNAIRE DE LA TERMINOLOGIE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 599 (J. Basdevant ed., 1960); DICTIONNAIRE DE
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relevant State practice, and the rationale behind the historical development
of the law of occupation illustrate that nothing precludes the definition of
occupied territory from encompassing portions of the sea.
Article 42 is analyzed under the rules of treaty interpretation in Articles
31, 32, and 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.27 Although
the Convention does not formally apply to the Hague Regulations since it
governs only treaties adopted after its entry into force in 1980,28 the rules
embodied therein codified preexisting customary international law,29 and
may be applied to the interpretation of treaties concluded before the Convention’s entry into force.30 The Convention requires simultaneous consideration of the text, context, and object and purposes of a treaty, while using
preparatory works as supplementary means of interpretation.31

DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 1078 (Jean Salmon ed., 2001). Part V explores which specific areas fall into this definition. See infra Part V.
27. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter VCLT].
28. Id. art. 4.
29. See, for example, the case law of the International Court of Justice. Arbitral Award
of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), Judgment, 1991 I.C.J. Rep. 53, ¶ 48 (Nov. 12);
Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), Judgment, 1994 I.C.J. Rep. 6, ¶ 41 (Feb. 3);
Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots./Namib.), Judgment, 1999 I.C.J. Rep. 1045, ¶ 18 (Dec. 13);
LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), Judgment , 2001 I.C.J. Rep. 466, ¶ 99 (June 27); Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 12, ¶ 83 (Mar. 31); Dispute
Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), Judgment, 2009 I.C.J.
Rep. 213, ¶ 47 (July 13); Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 14,
¶ 65 (Apr. 20); Maritime Dispute (Peru v. Chile), Judgment, 2014 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 57 (Jan.
27); Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Som. v. Kenya), Preliminary Objections,
2017 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 63 (Feb. 2). See also the international and national case law analyzed by
Santiago Torres Bernárdez, Interpretation of Treaties by the International Court of Justice Following
the Adoption of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in LIBER AMICORUM: PROFESSOR IGNAZ SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN IN HONOUR OF HIS 80TH BIRTHDAY 721 (Gerhard
Hafner et al. eds., 1998).
30. See Iron Rhine (“Ijzeren Rijn”) Railway (Belg. v. Neth.), 27 R.I.A.A. 35, 62 (Perm.
Ct. Arb. 2005).
31. For more on this in recent scholarship, see ULF LINDERFALK, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES (2007); ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, THE INTERPRETATION OF
ACTS AND RULES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008); TREATY INTERPRETATION AND
THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: 30 YEARS ON (Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Olufemi Elias & Panos Merkouris eds., 2010); INTERPRETATION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (Andrea Bianchi, Daniel Peat & Matthew Windsor eds., 2015); RICHARD GARDINER,
TREATY INTERPRETATION (2d ed. 2015); CHANG-FA LO, TREATY INTERPRETATION UNDER THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES (2017).
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The initial question is whether the ordinary meaning of territory encompasses sea areas. And here, there are conflicting definitions.32 Lexico defines
territory as “[a]n area of land under the jurisdiction of a ruler or state,”33
apparently excluding the sea. Other definitions support the potential inclusion of portions of the sea. For instance, the Cambridge Dictionary defines territory as “(an area of) land, or sometimes sea, that is considered as belonging to
or connected with a particular country or person.”34
Similarly, in legal terminology territory includes waters such as internal
waters and the territorial sea. For instance, even in 1885, the dictionary authored by Carlos Calvo defined territory as including areas of the sea.35 Most
contemporary dictionaries of international law confirm this view, considering territory as comprised of both land territory and sea areas.36 Further,
Black’s Law Dictionary defines territory as “a geographical area included within
a particular government’s jurisdiction; the portion of the earth’s surface that
is in a state’s exclusive possession and control,”37 thus encompassing the areas of the sea that are under the territorial sovereignty of the State.
Several official State publications concerning international humanitarian
law support this conclusion. These include the U.S. Law of War Manual,
which states that “‘territory’ is used to describe the land, waters, and airspace
subject to the sovereignty of a state,”38 and the U.K. Manual on the Law of
Armed Conflict, according to which, “internal waters and the territorial sea . .
. together with the land territories constitute the territory of a belligerent.”39
32. See DICTIONNAIRE DE LA TERMINOLOGIE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL, supra note
26, at 597.
33. Territory, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/territory (last visited
Oct. 21, 2019).
34. Territory, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/it/dizio
nario/inglese/territory (last visited Oct. 21, 2019) (emphasis added).
35. 2 CARLOS CALVO, DICTIONNAIRE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC ET PRIVÉ
253 (1885) (“Le territoire national comprend non seulement le sol sur lequel habitent les
sujets les possessions que la nation a outre mer sous le nom de colonies, de comptoirs de
commerce, ou sous toute autre dénomination, mais encore leurs dépendances, telles que la
partie de la mer qui les baigne, les lacs, les rivières, les plages, les golfes, etc. . . .”) (emphasis added).
36. See ENGLISH-FRENCH-SPANISH-RUSSIAN MANUAL ON THE TERMINOLOGY OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (LAW OF PEACE) AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
152 (Isaac Peanson ed., 1983); DICTIONNAIRE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC, supra
note 26, at 1076.
37. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1611 (9th ed. 2009).
38. U.S. LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 10, § 13.2.1.
39. See UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 13.6 (2004) [hereinafter U.K. LOAC MANUAL].
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Moving to the context of Article 42, both the entire treaty,40 and other
applicable rules of international law,41 must be considered. The title of the
treaty itself—“Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of
War on Land”42—suggests it is only applicable to land territory. Further, Article 1 states, “[t]he Contracting Powers shall issue instructions to their
armed land forces which shall be in conformity with the Regulations.”43 The
treaty title and Article 1’s focus indicate the principal objective of the drafters
was the regulation of conflicts occurring on land, not conflict at sea. This
gives rise to a presumption that the rules therein apply only to land warfare.44
Nonetheless, the provisions of the law of occupation regarding means of
transport and communications do refer to the sea, contradicting the view
that the drafters wanted the Hague Regulations to have no application at sea.
Article 53 provides that “[a]ll appliances, whether on land, at sea, or in the
air, adapted for the transmission of news, or for the transport of persons or
things, exclusive of cases governed by naval law, depots of arms, and, generally, all kinds of munitions of war, may be seized.”45 Article 54 states that
“[s]ubmarine cables connecting an occupied territory with a neutral territory
shall not be seized or destroyed except in the case of absolute necessity. They
must likewise be restored and compensation fixed when peace is made.”46
The latter provision was at the center of significant debate during the preparatory works.47 At the 1899 Hague Conference, objecting States were successful in excluding a similar provision from what became Convention No.
II with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land48 because they

40. VCLT, supra note 27, art. 31(2).
41. Id. art. 31(3)(c).
42. Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague Convention IV]; see also Singer, supra
note 1, at 258 (discussing the use of the word land).
43. Hague Convention IV, supra note 42, art. 1 (emphasis added).
44. See Kubo Mačák, Silent War: Applicability of the Jus in Bello to Military Space Operations,
94 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 1, 20 (2018).
45. Hague Regulations, supra note 6, art. 53 (emphasis added). For more on this provision, see infra notes 204–07 and accompanying text.
46. Id. art. 54 (emphasis added).
47. See A. PIERCE HIGGINS, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES CONCERNING THE LAWS AND USAGES OF WAR: TEXTS OF CONVENTIONS WITH COMMENTARIES 271 (1909).
48. Convention No. II with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July
29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403.
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wanted to avoid all regulation of naval warfare in a treaty that aimed at regulating land warfare.49 On the contrary, in 1907, States accepted this rule
while otherwise maintaining as minimal an incursion into the law of naval
warfare as possible.50 However, Article 53 and Article 54 unequivocally
demonstrate that the 1907 Hague Regulations do apply to sea areas under
certain circumstances. Accordingly, consideration of the entire text of the
treaty confirms that Article 42 encompasses portions of the sea.
That the law of occupation applies at sea is also evidenced by Common
Article 2 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, according to which “[t]he Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with
no armed resistance.”51 While the First Geneva Convention is applicable to
land only,52 and the Second Convention is applicable only to the sea,53 there
is no general specification in the other Conventions limiting their applicability to the land.54 The Fourth Convention, which enshrines many rules on the
protection of civilians in occupied territory, contains no language indicating
its scope is limited to the land, nor is it suggested by the commentaries published under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross.55
In addition, the duty of all States under Common Article 1 “to respect
and ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions in all circumstances”56 suggests that absent any textual limitation such as those in the First and Second
Conventions, the Conventions apply to every situation of armed conflict,
49. See PIERCE HIGGINS, supra note 47, at 271; DORIS APPEL GRABER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 185 (1949).
50. For an overview of the debate, see KOUTROULIS, supra note 7, at 35–37.

51. See, e.g., GC IV, supra note 6, art. 2.
52. Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
the Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
53. Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S.
85.
54. See Katja Schöberl, The Geographical Scope of Application of the Conventions, in THE 1949
GENEVA CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 7, at 67, 70.
55. This issue of occupied territory at sea is not addressed in the commentaries on
Common Article 2 to the Geneva Conventions. See COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION I FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN THE
ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD. GENEVA (Jean Pictet ed., 1952); INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST GENEVA CONVENTION: CONVENTION (I) FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN
ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD (2016).
56. See, e.g., GC IV, supra note 6, art. 1.
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including armed conflict at sea.57 Accordingly, the notion of territory in the
Fourth Convention encompasses land and maritime territory alike.58
The analysis of other rules of applicable international law demonstrates
unequivocally that the normative context of Article 42 establishes that it refers to both land and maritime territory. Indeed, since the second half of the
sixteenth century, there has been an emerging trend recognizing the full sovereignty of States in areas of the sea adjacent to their coasts, areas now
known as the territorial sea.59 Today, Article 2(1) of the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) recognizes this historical
trend, stating, “[t]he sovereignty of a coastal state extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic
waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea.”60 Arguably,
the development of the law of the sea shifted the focus from “marine spaces”
to “marine territories.”61 This evolution is relevant to the interpretation of
Article 42 in its normative context and reinforces the interpretation of territory under this provision as encompassing portions of the sea.62
Finally, to interpret Article 42 as including sea areas is consistent with
the object and purpose of the Hague Regulations, whose primary aim in occupied territory is the protection of the sovereignty of the ousted sovereign
while allowing the occupying power to maintain control over that territory.63
As has been stated, it would be illogical for the law of occupation to differentiate between land territory and maritime territory in those instances when

57. Mačák, supra note 44, at 21.
58. See Singer, supra note 1, at 261.
59. For a historical overview, see R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE. THE LAW OF THE SEA
71–75 (3d ed. 1999); DONALD R. ROTHWELL & TIM STEPHENS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF THE SEA 61–70 (2d ed. 2016); Sarah Wolf, Territorial Sea, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Aug. 2013), https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.
1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1229.
60. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 2(1), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS] (emphasis added).
61. Prosper Weil, Des Espaces Maritimes aux Territoires Maritimes: Vers une Cinception Territorialiste de la Délimitation Maritime, in LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL AU SERVICE DE LA PAIX,
DE LA JUSTICE ET DU DÉVELOPPEMENT: MÉLANGES EN HOMMAGE À MICHEL VIRALLY
501 (A. Pédone ed., 1991).
62. For further discussion, see infra Part V.
63. On the aims of the law of occupation, see LONGOBARDO, supra note 3, at 82–87
(noting that the protection of the local population has increasingly become one of the goals
of this body of law, as demonstrated by the adoption of the 1949 Geneva Conventions).
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the occupying power substitutes its authority for that of the ousted sovereign.64 Indeed, an alternate legal regime for maritime areas would risk endangering the rights of the ousted sovereign and the local population since it
would create “factually uncontrolled areas.”65 Accordingly, the object and
scope of the Hague Regulations suggest territory, as it appears in Article 42,
includes maritime territory.
Contrary examples in State doctrine do exist. For instance, India denies
that the sea is subject to occupation. According to the Indian Ministry of
Defence,
In contrast to the land, the sea is a medium for movement. It cannot be occupied and fortified. Navies cannot dig in at sea, or seize and hold ocean areas
that have great intrinsic value. Indeed, although the objectives of naval operations involve control or influence over sea areas to varying degrees, they
do not involve occupation of sea areas on a permanent basis.66

The Ministry of Defence of the Netherlands also appears to have a contrary
opinion. According to Dutch maritime doctrine,
The three forms of control of the sea [command of the sea, sea control and
sea denial] can be regarded as points on a scale where control by one party
shifts to control by the other . . . . In other domains too, obtaining and
maintaining a degree of superiority is often a prerequisite for the friendly
operation. This is the case in all environments where full control or occupation is normally impossible: the sea, the air, outer space, the information domain
(including cyberspace) and the electromagnetic and acoustic spectra.67

On close reading, it seems doubtful that this statement is intended to
pertain to all portions of the sea. Another statement in the same document
indicates, “it is impossible to occupy positions on the high seas,”68 suggesting
that other areas of the sea can be occupied. Moreover, underlying both the
64. Singer, supra note 1, at 259.
65. Id.
66. See INTEGRATED HEADQUARTERS, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (NAVY), INDIAN MARITIME DOCTRINE 2009, at 54 (2009) (emphasis added). Faraone also supports this view. See
Arturo Faraone, Diritto Umanitario e Guerra Navale, in QUALE DIRITTO NEI CONFLITTI ARMATI? 55, 56 (Irini Papanicolopulu & Tullio Scovazzi eds., 2006).
67. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, FUNDAMENTALS OF MARITIME OPERATIONS: NETHERLANDS MARITIME MILITARY DOCTRINE 299 (2015) [hereinafter NETHERLANDS MARITIME
MILITARY DOCTRINE] (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 83.
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Dutch and Indian doctrinal documents is the belief that the sea is different
from land territory strategically and that is must be considered only as a medium for movement,69 a proposition the development of technology increasingly challenges.70
State practice suggests that certain portions of the sea may be occupied.71
For example, Article 9 of the Instrument of Surrender between Italy and the
Allied Forces provides that “all merchant ships, fishing or other craft of
whatever flag, all aircraft and inland transport of whatever nationality in Italian or Italian-occupied territory or waters will, pending verification of their identity
and status, be prevented from leaving.”72 Similarly, Albania, during the Corfu
Channel case proceedings before the International Court of Justice, declared
that the territorial sea and internal waters of Albania had been occupied by
British vessels:
Vingt-six bâtiments de la marine de guerre britannique ont violé les 12 et
13 novembre la souveraineté albanaise lui apparteriant aussi sur sa mer
tcrritoriale et les eaux intérieures dans le canal nord de Corfou en occupant
lesdits jours, à l’aide de violence, la mer territoriale albanaise et en excluant
les autorités et l’ordre public albanais.73

69. See JULIAN CORBETT, SOME PRINCIPLES OF MARITIME STRATEGY 93 (Naval Institute Press 1988) (1911).
70. See Steven Haines, Naval Warfare, in STUART CASEY-MASLEN WITH STEVEN
HAINES, HAGUE LAW INTERPRETED: THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT 274, 279 (2018).
71. For an accurate assessment, see KOUTROULIS, supra note 7, at 36–38.
72. Instrument of Surrender of Italy, U.S./U.K.-It., art. 9, Sept. 29, 1943, 61 Stat. 2742,
T.I.A.S. 1604 (emphasis added).
73. Contre-Memoire Soumis par le Gouvernement de la République Populaire d’Albanie (Counter-Memorial Submitted by the People’s Republic of Albania), Corfu Channel
(U.K. v. Alb.), ¶ 145, (June 15, 1948), https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/1/1492.
pdf.
Twenty-six vessels of the British navy violated on 12 and 13 November the Albanian sovereignty also belonging to it on its territorial sea and the internal waters in the north channel
of Corfu occupying the said days, with the help of violence, the Albanian territorial sea and
excluding Albanian authorities and public order.

(translation by author) Unfortunately, the Court did not deal with issues of the law of occupation in its decision.
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More State practice on the occupation of maritime territory derives from
the prolonged Israeli occupation of the Occupied Palestinian Territory.74 Israel has taken the position that portions of the Gulf of Suez are subject to
occupation.75 In response, the United States asserted the “high seas are not
subject to belligerent occupation” and that “the notion of occupation of territorial sea may be somewhat problematic,” without ruling it out entirely.76
The agreements concluded between Israel and the Palestine Liberation
Organization in the 1990s, commonly known as the Oslo Accords,77 included provisions on the maritime territory adjacent to the Gaza Strip. For
example, under Article V(1)(1) of the 1994 Agreement on the Gaza Strip and
the Jericho Area, the territorial jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority “shall
include land, subsoil and territorial waters,” whereas Israel is responsible “for
defense against external threats from the sea” under Article VIII.78 These
provisions were reproduced in Article XVII(2)(a) and Article XII(2) of the
1995 Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.79
This agreement also divided the maritime territory off the Gaza coast
into three areas, with a different partition of responsibilities between Israel

74. On this occupation, which has been explored by vast scholarship, see, for example,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, supra note
9; ORNA BEN-NAFTALI, MICHAEL SFARD & HEDI VITERBO, THE ABC OF THE OPT: A
LEGAL LEXICON OF THE ISRAELI CONTROL OVER THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY (2018); DINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 16–34.
75. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel, Memorandum of Law on the Right to Develop
New Oil Fields in Sinai and the Gulf of Suez (Aug. 1, 1977), reprinted in 17 INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL MATERIALS 432 (1978).
76. U.S. Department of State, Memorandum of Law on Israel’s Right to Develop New
Oil Fields in Sinai and the Gulf of Suez (Oct. 1, 1976), reprinted in 16 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 733 (1977).
77. On the legal value of these agreements, see generally Peter Malanczuk, Some Basic
Aspects of the Agreements between Israel and the PLO from the Perspective of International Law, 7 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 485 (1996); RAJA SHEHADEH, FROM OCCUPATION TO INTERIM ACCORDS: ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES (1997); GEOFFREY R. WATSON, THE OSLO ACCORDS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN AGREEMENTS (2000).
78. Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area arts. V(1)(1), VIII, Isr.-P.L.O.,
May 4, 1994, 33 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 622 (1994).
79. Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip arts. XVII(2)(a), XII(2),
Isr.-P.L.O., Sept. 28, 1995, 36 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 551 (1997).
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and the Palestinian Authority.80 From the standpoint of the law of occupation, these provisions are relevant because they represent a transfer of responsibility from the occupying power to the authorities of the occupied
territory.81 These agreements not only did not terminate the occupation,82
but the issues addressed therein are issues within the scope of the authority
granted by the law of occupation to an occupying power.83 It follows that
Israel was able to transfer jurisdiction over the territorial waters of the Gaza
Strip only because it retained it under the law of occupation.84
As further evidence of State practice, during the U.S.-led occupation of
Iraq (2003–04), the occupying powers applied the law of occupation to the
maritime territory of Iraq. In one case, they blocked the Panamanian flagged
vessel Navstar 1, which was suspected of oil trafficking, from leaving Iraqi
territorial waters, seized all relevant documentation from the vessel, detained
the crew as security internees, and then referred the matter to the competent
Iraqi authorities. These actions were accomplished utilizing the powers
80. See id. annex I, art. 14; see also James Kraska, Rule Selection in the Case of Israel’s Naval
Blockade of Gaza: Law of Naval Warfare or Law of the Sea?, 13 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 367, 375–76 (2010).
81. Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 13, ¶ 77
Lastly, a number of agreements have been signed since 1993 between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization imposing various obligations on each Party. Those agreements
inter alia required Israel to transfer to Palestinian authorities certain powers and responsibilities exercised in the Occupied Palestinian Territory by its military authorities and civil administration.

82. Id.
83. Implicitly, Article 47 of Geneva Convention IV acknowledges this mechanism by
affirming that agreements between the occupying power and the local population may not
affect the protection offered by the law of occupation. See GC IV, supra note 6, art. 47. For
more on this provision, see infra notes 184–86 and accompanying text.
84. Clearly, the perspective is different under the principle of self-determination of
peoples. Indeed, from the Palestinian perspective the agreements are a step towards the
attainment of self-determination, whereas from the Israeli perspective they are a transfer of
competences under the law of occupation. The fact that the agreements can be seen from
these two different perspectives should not be a surprise since the law of occupation
emerged before the principle of self-determination of peoples and the two are not perfectly
aligned. On the issue of the respect of the principle of self-determination of peoples in the
accords, see Antonio Cassese, The Israel-PLO Agreement and Self-Determination, 4 EUROPEAN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 56 (1993). On the interplay between the law of occupation and the principle of self-determination of peoples, see Jorge Cardona Llorens, Le
Principe du Droit des Peuples à Disposer D’eux-mêmes et L’occupation Étrangère, in DROIT DU POUVOIR, POUVOIR DU DROIT: MÉLANGES OFFERTS À JEAN SALMON 855 (Nicolas Angelet ed.,
2007).
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granted by the law of occupation.85 Additionally, the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA), which administered occupied Iraq in 2003 and 2004,
adopted legislation regulating media activity on the basis of “the extensive
specific authority granted to the CPA under the laws and usages of war for
the control of all appliances, whether on land, sea, or in the air, adapted for
the transmission of information.”86
One author has noted that because States have not regulated occupation
at sea through the law of naval warfare, this implies that they believed the
law of occupation already governed it.87 As detailed below, the law of naval
warfare does not address the administration of hostile maritime territory,88
but it is undeniable that at the time of the codification of the law of occupation there was a widespread consensus that maritime territory could be occupied. Article 88 of the 1913 The Laws of Naval War Governing the Relations between Belligerents (Oxford Manual), a private codification authored
by the Institute of International Law, demonstrates this point, concluding
that maritime territory may be occupied and “is subject to the laws and usages of
war on land.”89 Although this document is not formally binding, most authors
argue that it codified the customary international law that existed in 1913.90
Moreover, the British Maritime Law Committee of the International Law

85. For more on this episode, see Michael J. Kelly, Iraq and the Law of Occupation: New
Tests for an Old Law, 6 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 127, 149–50
(2003); see also ROB MCLAUGHLIN, UNITED NATIONS NAVAL PEACE OPERATIONS IN THE
TERRITORIAL SEA 52–53 (2009).
86. Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 14: Prohibited Media Activity pmbl. (June 10,
2003), reprinted in 2 STEFAN TALMON, THE OCCUPATION OF IRAQ: THE OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS OF THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY AND THE IRAQI GOVERNING
COUNCIL 31 (2013).
87. Singer, supra note 1, at 259–60.
88. See infra Part VII.
89. The Laws of Naval War Governing the Relations between Belligerents, Aug. 9,
1913, art. 88, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 1123, 1135 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter Oxford Manual] (emphasis added).
90. See Natalino Ronzitti, Le Droit Humanitaire Applicable aux Conflits Armés en Mer, 242
RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 28–29 (1993); SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA 61 (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995); Kelly, supra
note 85, at 131, 150; James Kraska, Military Operations, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF THE SEA 866, 876 (Donald R. Rothwell, Alex G. Oude Elferink, Karen N. Scott &
Tim Stephens eds., 2015). Contra Pietro Verri, The 1913 Oxford Manual, in A COLLECTION
OF AGREEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS WITH COMMENTARIES 329, 339–40 (Natalino Ronzitti
ed., 1988).
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Association in 1920 proposed that “territorial waters occupied by the belligerents” should be considered as within the geographical scope of application
of the law of naval warfare, thus recognizing that territorial waters may be
occupied.91
Finally, the geopolitical rationale that shaped the creation of the law of
occupation demonstrates that the fact of occupation and the law of occupation apply to waters under the sovereignty of a State. Prior to the nineteenth
century, it was commonly accepted that the military occupation of a territory
was a legitimate means of annexing the territory to the occupying State. With
the 1815 Congress of Vienna, European States began to adopt a different
view, that military occupation did not sever the link between sovereignty and
territory, so that territory occupied during a war should return to its sovereign at the conflict’s conclusion unless a peace treaty provided otherwise.92
From this perspective, the territory is the property of the sovereign, even
though war has temporarily severed the parallelism between effective control
and sovereignty.93
However, the law of the occupation was created to deal with the rights
of European sovereigns only. Accordingly, it did not apply to areas of the
world not organized on the model of the European nation State.94 For these
91. See Report of the British Maritime Committee, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION,
REPORT OF THE TWENTY-NINTH CONFERENCE 165, 166 (1920).
92. For more on the origins of the law of occupation, see KOLB & VITÉ, supra note 8,
at 9–58; Eyal Benvenisti, The Origins of the Concept of Belligerent Occupation, 26 LAW AND HISTORY REVIEW 621 (2008); Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, Preoccupied with Occupation: Critical Examination of the Historical Development of the Law of Occupation, 94 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE
RED CROSS 51 (2012).
93. See, e.g., Final Act of the Congress of Vienna art. C(3), June 9, 1815, 64 Consol. T.S.
453, reprinted in HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 639 (3d ed. 1846)
(“Le Prince Ludovisi Buoncompagni conservera pur lui et ses Successeurs légitimes, toutes
les propriétés que sa Famille possédait dans la principauté de Piombino, dans l’ile d’Elbe ses
dépendances, avant l’occupation de ces pays par les troupes Françaises en 1799.”) (emphasis
added) (“Prince Ludovisi Buoncompagni will retain for himself and his legitimate Successors, all the properties that his family possessed in the principality of Piombino, in the island
of Elba, its dependencies, before the occupation of these countries by the French troops in
1799.”) (translation by author).
94. The famous legal theorist Carl Schmitt argued that treating European territory differently than territory outside Europe formed the basis of the entire development of modern
public international law. See CARL SCHMITT, DER NOMOS DER ERDE IM VÖLKERRECHT DES
JUS PUBLICUM EUROPAEUM (1950) (noting the publication of the English translation in
2006 by G.L. Ulmen, titled THE NOMOS OF THE EARTH). On the influence of Schmitt’s
scholarship on the law of occupation, see Nehal Bhuta, The Antinomies of Transformative Occupation, 16 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 721 (2005).
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areas, occupation was a lawful way to acquire territory until the mid-twentieth century when self-determination of peoples was recognized as a fundamental principle of international law.95 The legal fiction used by the European States to acquire colonial territories was to declare them terra nullius,
nobody’s land.96 That expression did not mean these were lands without inhabitants, which would be absurd since entire civilizations dwelled in those
territories, but as lands without a sovereign recognized as such by Eurocentric States. Although today this notion of terra nullius is no longer accepted,97
at the time territory (and the local population dwelling therein) was relevant
only as they constituted property of the sovereign. Territory was defined as
the spatial geographic scope over which the sovereign exercised its full and
largely unlimited powers, an element that could be ceded to other States at
the discretion of the sovereign.98 It is useful to recall how this theory constructed the relationship between European States and territory because it
demonstrates that, originally, the law of occupation was created to deal with
areas under State territorial sovereignty. Accordingly, since State sovereignty
extends beyond its land territory to areas of the sea, there is no reason to
restrict the definition of occupied territory under Article 42 of the Hague
Regulations to land territory, rather it applies to maritime territory as well.

95. See U.N. Charter art. 1. See generally Martti Koskenniemi, National Self-Determination
Today: Problems of Legal Theory and Practice, 43 INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 241 (1994); ANTONIO CASSESE, THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL
REAPPRAISAL (1996); THEODORE CHRISTAKIS, LE DROIT À L’AUTODÉTERMINATION EN
DEHORS DES SITUATIONS DE DÉCOLONISATION (1999); JOSHUA CASTELLINO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SELF-DETERMINATION (2000); Stefan Oeter, Self-Determination, in THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 313 (Bruno Simma, Daniel-Rasmus
Khan, Heorg Nolte & Andreas Paulus eds., 3d ed. 2012); Giuseppe Palmisano, Il Principio di
Autodeterminazione dei Popoli, in ENCICLOPEDIA DEL DIRITTO: ANNALI V 82 (2012); IL PRINCIPIO DI AUTODETERMINAZIONE DEI POPOLI ALLA PROVA DEL NUOVO MILLENNIO
(Marcella Distefano ed., 2014); JAMIE TRINIDAD, SELF-DETERMINATION IN DISPUTED COLONIAL TERRITORIES (2018).
96. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A/B) No. 53, at 44–64 (Apr. 5). This practice is well described by the High Court of Australia in the Mabo v. Queensland [No. 2] decision. Mabo v. Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR
1, 32 (Austl.).
97. See Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. Rep. 12, ¶¶ 80–81 (Oct. 6)
(stressing that terra nullius may refer only to areas devoid of inhabitants); see also Mabo v.
Queensland [No. 2], supra note 96, at 41–42.
98. See CALVO, supra note 35, at 253.
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In conclusion, Article 42, correctly interpreted, coupled with relevant
State practice and an understanding of the historical background of occupation and the theories underlying it, demonstrates that nothing precludes including portions of the sea within the definition of occupied territory.99
IV. REQUIREMENTS TO CONSIDER PORTIONS OF THE SEA OCCUPIED
TERRITORY
Once established that portions of the sea are included within the definition
of occupied territory, it is necessary to explore the conditions for determining maritime territory to be under occupation. In particular, this Part addresses whether it is possible to occupy maritime territory without occupying
land territory, and whether the occupation of land territory necessarily implies the occupation of the adjacent maritime territory. In this regard, two
opposite principles are at play: first, that maritime territory is ontologically
an extension of land territory, and second, that small portions of territory
may be occupied without altering the status of other portions of territory of
the same State.
In answering the first question, it is noted preliminarily that legal scholarship has rarely explored the possibility of occupying maritime territory
without occupying land territory. Rather, most academics focus on whether
the use of naval (and aerial) means may be sufficient to exercise actual authority over a portion of adjacent land territory. For instance, the Institute of
International Law stated that an island was under occupation if a State exercises actual authority through its navy over its entire coastline even in the
absence of any military presence on the island.100 Although some scholars
support this conclusion,101 most authorities reject the idea that “occupation
could be enforced solely by either naval or air power” since “control of air
space did not by itself meet the requirement of ‘effective control’ for the

99. See, e.g., 4 ANGELO PIERO SERENI, DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 2000 (1965); Allan
Gerson, Off-Shore Oil Exploration by a Belligerent Occupant: The Gulf of Suez Dispute, 71 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 725, 729 (1977); see also KOUTROULIS, supra note
7, at 38–39; Sassòli, supra note 7, at 1396; Singer, supra note 1, at 271–72; DINSTEIN, supra
note 8, at 56; Eric David, Principes de Droit des Conflits Armés 699 (6th ed. 2019) (concluding that the control exercised by Israel over the maritime area off the coast of the Gaza
Strip is occupation of territory under Article 42).
100. Manuel des Lois de la Guerre Maritime, 26 ANNUAIRE DE L’INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 24, 330 (1913).
101. See, e.g., KOUTROULIS, supra note 7, at 39.
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purposes of [international humanitarian law]. Therefore, only effective control on land would characterize military occupation within the meaning of
[international humanitarian law].”102
On the question of whether maritime territory may be occupied independently of the occupation of land territory, it is important to recall that the
occupation of one portion of territory does not necessarily result in the occupation of the entire territory.103 This is clearly demonstrated by Common
Article 2 to the Geneva Conventions, according to which “[t]he Convention
shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory.”104
Similarly, Article 42 of the Hague Regulations provides that “[t]he occupation extends only to the territory where [actual] authority has been established and can be exercised.”105 Examples of partial occupation include
Northern Cyprus after the 1974 Turkish intervention,106 the Syrian territory
of the Golan Heights by Israel after the 1967 Six-Day War,107 and the Turkish
occupation of a portion of northern Syria since 2016.108 Accordingly, if maritime territory is treated exactly as land territory, as long as a hostile force
exercises actual authority, a specific portion of maritime territory can be occupied irrespective of any occupation of land territory.
Nonetheless, most authorities reject this seemingly logical conclusion
and hold that the occupation of maritime territory may exist only in connection to the occupation of some land territory.109 For instance, Article 88 of
the Oxford Manual states, “occupation of maritime territory . . . exists only
102. See ICRC, OCCUPATION AND OTHER FORMS OF ADMINISTRATION OF FOREIGN
TERRITORY, supra note 14, at 17; see also Michael Bothe, De Facto Control of Land or Sea Areas:
Its Relevance under the Law of Armed Conflict, in Particular Air and Missile Warfare, 45 ISRAEL
YEARBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS 37, 39 (2015).
103. See 4 NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE, DM 69 (2 ed), MANUAL OF ARMED
FORCES LAW: LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT § 9.2.10 (2019); U.S. LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra
note 10, § 11.2.3; Sassòli, supra note 7, at 1398–99.
104. See, e.g., GC IV, supra note 6, art. 2 (emphasis added).
105. Hague Regulations, supra note 6, art. 42.
106. On the occupation of Northern Cyprus, see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
107. On the legal status of the Golan Heights, see Ray Murphy & Declan Gannon,
Changing the Landscape: Israel’s Gross Violations of International Law in the Occupied Syrian Golan,
11 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 139 (2008).
108. On the occupation of Syrian territory by Turkey, see Shane Reeves & David Wallace, Has Turkey Occupied Northern Syria?, LAWFARE (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/has-turkey-occupied-northern-syria.
109. See 2 ALBÉRIC ROLIN, LE DROIT MODERNE DE LA GUERRE: LES PRINCIPES, LES
CONVENTIONS, LES USAGES ET LES ABUS 281–82 (1921); Sassòli, supra note 7, at 1396;
Singer, supra note 1, at 260–61; DINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 56.
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when there is at the same time an occupation of continental territory, by
either a naval or a military force.”110 The preparatory works of the Manual
reveal that the members of the Institute of International Law extensively
debated this point.111 The view finally accepted in the wording of Article 88,
which had been advocated particularly by Edouard Rolin-Jaequemyns,112 was
adopted with four votes in favor and three abstentions.113
The Oxford Manual rule that the occupation of maritime territory can only
follow the occupation of land territory is based on the relationship between
land and maritime territory under international law. Indeed, the fact that a
State can exist only if it has a land territory limits the legal parallelism between
maritime and land territory. Land territory appears to be an indispensable
element to the exercise of governmental authority for the emergence of a
State in the international arena. Indeed, although how States emerge in international law has been the center of intense debate,114 land territory is always a necessary element. Maritime territory, however, is viewed, under public international law in general and under the international law of the sea in
particular, as an extension and consequence of the existence of land territory,115 the quintessential element for statehood. The principle that the “land
dominates the sea,”116 according to which “[i]t is the land which confers upon
the coastal state a right to the waters off its coasts,”117 reflects this reality.

110. Oxford Manual, supra note 89, art. 88.
111. Manuel des Lois de la Guerre Maritime, supra note 100, at 328–30.
112. Id. at 330 (“Pour qu’il y ait occupation maritime il faut sans doute qu’il y ait une
occupation terrestre.”) (“For there to be maritime occupation there must be a land occupation.”) (translation by author).
113. Id. at 331–32.
114. Among the vast scholarship, see GAETANO ARANGIO-RUIZ, L’ETAT DANS LE
SENS DU DROIT DES GENS ET LA NOTION DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 3–63, 265–406
(1976); JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed.
2006); Antonello Tancredi, Lo Stato nel Diritto Internazionale tra Effettività e Legalità/Legittimità,
16 ARS INTERPRETANDI 131 (2011).
115. See Grisbardana Case (Nor. v. Swed.), 11 R.I.A.A. 155, 159 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1909)
(concluding “the maritime territory is essentially an appurtenance of a land territory”).
116. The principle is mentioned in the North Sea Continental Shelf and Delimitation of the
Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area judgments of the International Court of Justice.
See North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J.
Rep. 3, ¶ 96 (Feb. 20); Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area
(Can./U.S.), Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. Rep. 246, ¶¶ 157, 226 (Oct. 12).
117. Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 116, 133 (Dec. 18).
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Although current technology might sustain human communities living
in maritime territory with no link to land territory, international law still considers land territory essential, as it is land that allows the development and
exercise of full sovereignty.118 Likewise, under the law of occupation, only
land territory allows a hostile force to establish the temporary administration
governing the occupied territory required by Article 43 of the Hague Regulations.119 Since the law of occupation strikes a balance between the hostile
character of the occupation and the need to temporarily govern the occupied
territory,120 it can only apply in the same circumstances that would allow a
sovereign to exercise legitimate governmental functions, that is, in connection with land territory. It follows that maritime territory cannot be occupied
unless the occupation also covers portions of land territory. There is no contrary State practice in which a State has occupied only maritime territory.
The second issue is whether the occupation of a portion of land territory
also implies the occupation of maritime territory. Some authors consider that
the status of the land territory determines the status of the maritime territory.121 They view the “land dominates the sea” principle as creating an unbreakable link between the status of the land territory and that of the maritime territory. However, this principle only means that the status of maritime
territory is a consequence of the status of land territory; it does not necessarily follow that occupation of land territory results in occupation of maritime territory.
Moreover, under international humanitarian law, it is clear that placing
one portion of territory under occupation has no effect on the status of other
portions of the State’s territory. On this point, Hague Regulations Article 42
is very clear, stating, “[t]he occupation extends only to the territory where
such authority has been established and can be exercised”122—a provision
that is also relevant to maritime territory. Since the law of occupation imposes administrative responsibilities only on those portions of territory over
which the occupying power exercises actual authority, the status of maritime
territory is not affected by the occupation of land territory unless the occupying power exercises actual authority over the maritime territory as well.123

118. See Island of Palmas (Neth. v. US), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 833 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).
119. Hague Regulations, supra note 6, art. 43.
120. For further discussion, see LONGOBARDO, supra note 3, at 176.
121. See Sassòli, supra note 7, at 1396; DINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 56.
122. Hague Regulations, supra note 6, art. 42.
123. Singer, supra note 1, at 266–67.
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To consider maritime territory under occupation, the occupying power
must exercise actual authority. In particular, the ousted sovereign must be
unable to exercise its authority over the maritime territory, and the occupying
power must have substituted its authority for that of the sovereign.124 In assessing whether that has occurred, the guidelines utilized by the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) provide useful elements
in determining whether a territory is occupied:
[T]he occupying power must be in a position to substitute its own authority
for that of the occupied authorities, which must have been rendered incapable of functioning publicly; the enemy’s forces have surrendered, been
defeated or withdrawn. In this respect, battle areas may not be considered
as occupied territory. However, sporadic local resistance, even successful,
does not affect the reality of occupation; the occupying power has a sufficient force present, or the capacity to send troops within a reasonable time
to make the authority of the occupying power felt; a temporary administration has been established over the territory; the occupying power has issued
and enforced directions to the civilian population.125

Even though the ICTY applied these elements to the occupation of land
territory, they can be adapted to maritime territory. Indeed, the degree of
authority needed to maintain the occupation is flexible, and it may vary depending on the geographical conformation of the territory, the number of
inhabitants, and their attitude towards the occupying power. In particular,
the occupying power needs not exercise actual authority over every portion
of occupied territory, but it is sufficient that the occupying power can readily
exercise authority if it decides to do so.126
These ICTY guidelines are particularly relevant to maritime territory,
which may require a different degree of control than land territory because
the population of people at sea is normally less visible and more transitory

124. See generally the discussion in BENVENISTI, supra note 5, at 43–51; LONGOBARDO,
supra note 3, at 35–39; DINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 48–54.
125. Prosecutor v. Naletilić and Martinović, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgment, ¶ 217
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2003) (citations omitted); see also Prosecutor v. Prlić et al., IT-04-74-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 320 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the former Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 2017).
126. See U.S. LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 10, § 12.2.2.1; see also Andrea Gattini,
Occupazione Bellica, in DIZIONARIO DI DIRITTO PUBBLICO 3889, 3891 (Sabino Cassese ed.,
2006); LONGOBARDO, supra note 3, at 36; DINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 49.
344

The Occupation of Maritime Territory

Vol. 95

than that of people dwelling on land.127 Usually, military vessels tasked with
preventing any performance of authority by the ousted sovereign and performing law enforcement responsibilities exercise actual authority over maritime territory. Accordingly, to consider maritime territory as under occupation, the occupying power must be able to expel enemy naval forces and
intervene promptly in every portion of the occupied territory if needed.128
Given the preceding, portions of maritime territory adjacent to occupied
land territory may not be under occupation, if the occupying power has not
also exercised specific actual authority over that maritime territory. When
deciding whether to extend its authority over maritime territory and its marine resources, the occupying power should be guided by the importance of
the marine resources to the population of the occupied territory.129
However, occupying the maritime territory may be necessary to maintain
the occupation of the land territory. In many instances, allowing the ousted
sovereign to exercise its authority on the sea adjacent to the occupied land
territory would threaten the occupying power’s control of the land territory.130 Indeed, at a practical level, at least for maritime territory adjacent to
occupied land territory, it may be difficult to envisage a situation in which
the occupying power exercises no authority over the maritime territory.131
In conclusion, although the definition of occupied territory found in Article 42 of the Hague Regulations encompasses maritime territory, an occupation of maritime territory may occur only in connection with occupation
of land territory and, even then, only if the occupying power exercises actual
authority over the maritime territory.
V.

WHICH PORTIONS OF THE SEA CAN BE OCCUPIED TERRITORY?

After establishing that maritime territory can be occupied, the issue of which
areas of the sea fall under occupation must be explored. The answer to this
question is far from straightforward and requires an analysis of which portions of the sea can be defined as maritime territory.

127. However, there are more “people at sea” today than in any other era of the human
history. See IRINI PAPANICOLOPULU, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF
PEOPLE AT SEA 15–24 (2017).
128. Singer, supra note 1, at 268–71.
129. BENVENISTI, supra note 5, at 55.
130. Singer, supra note 1, at 268.
131. KOUTROULIS, supra note 7, at 38–39.
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The departing point is Article 88 of the Oxford Manual, the only codification, albeit non-binding, on the occupation of maritime territory. Under
this provision, the occupation of maritime territory refers to “gulfs, bays,
roadsteads, ports, and territorial waters.”132 Although these areas continue to
exist in the current law of the sea, new marine spaces were created after
World War II. The question is whether or not these new areas are also subject to occupation.
The very definition of territory refers to areas under the full sovereignty
of a State.133 Under Article 2(1) of UNCLOS, “[t]he sovereignty of a coastal
state extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters and, in the case of
an archipelagic state, its archipelagic waters, to . . . the territorial sea.”134 The
wording of this provision contains two interesting aspects: first, internal waters and archipelagic waters are akin to land territory; second, land territory
and the territorial sea are spaces in which the territorial sovereignty of a State
can be exercised. Both are encompassed in the wider notion of territory. 135
For that reason, scholars generally agree that internal waters,136 the territorial
sea,137 and archipelagic waters138 can be occupied under Article 42 of the
Hague Regulations.139 In the words of one commentator, “[i]n internal waters, in the territorial sea and in archipelagic waters the coastal state exercises

132. Oxford Manual, supra note 89, art. 88.
133. See supra Part III.
134. UNCLOS, supra note 60, art. 2(1).
135. See Richard A. Barnes, Article 2, in UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW
OF THE SEA: A COMMENTARY 27, 32–33 (Alexander Proelss ed., 2017) [hereinafter LAW OF
THE SEA COMMENTARY] (arguing that “the rights of the coastal state over the territorial sea
does not differ in nature from rights exercised over land territory”).
136. UNCLOS, supra note 60, art. 8(1) (describing internal waters as “those waters
which lie landward of the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured”).
137. Id. art. 3 (defining territorial sea as a belt of sea adjacent to land territory (and
internal waters and archipelagic waters) and providing that “[e]very state has the right to
establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines”).
138. Under UNCLOS Article 49(1), archipelagic waters are “waters enclosed by the
archipelagic baselines.” UNCLOS, supra 60, art. 49(1). Article 47 establishes how States may
draw baselines. Id. art. 47.
139. See, e.g., SERENI, supra note 99, at 2000; Gerson, supra note 99, at 729; KOUTROULIS,
supra note 7, at 38–39; Sassòli, supra note 7, at 1396; Singer, supra note 1, at 271–72; DINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 56.
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sovereignty which is derived from its territorial sovereignty and the proximity to its coast; these zones therefore form the maritime part of the coastal
state’s territory.”140
More challenging is determining whether marine areas outside the territorial sovereignty of a State can be occupied. This debate focuses on the
exclusive economic zone141 and the continental shelf,142 since the coastal
State exercises more limited sovereign rights in these areas. When addressing
Israeli activities in the Gulf of Suez, some authors claim that the continental
shelf is subject to occupation.143 Indeed, Article 76(1) of UNCLOS refers to
the continental shelf as “the natural prolongation of its [the coastal State’s]
land territory.”144 According to Dinstein, this expression supports including
the continental shelf on the list of maritime areas that can be occupied.145
Natural prolongation, however, refers to the physical dimension of the
continental shelf, not to an extension of territorial sovereignty.146 Under the
law of the sea, it is an area outside State territorial sovereignty, in which the
coastal State may exercise certain sovereign rights, mainly for the exploration
and exploitation of natural resources, without exercising territorial sovereignty.147 As the U.S. Law of War Manual states, “coastal states may exercise
140. See Wolf, supra note 59, ¶ 2; see also ENRICO MILANO, UNLAWFUL TERRITORIAL
SITUATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (2006).
141. Under UNCLOS Article 55,
[t]he exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject
to the specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction
of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States are governed by the relevant
provisions of this Convention.

UNCLOS, supra note 60, art. 55.
142. Pursuant to Article 76(1) of UNCLOS,
[t]he continental shelf of a coastal state comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine
areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land
territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles
from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer
edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance.

Id. art. 76(1).
143. See Brice M. Clagett & O. Thomas Johnson, May Israel as a Belligerent Occupant Lawfully Exploit Previously Unexploited Oil Resources of the Gulf of Suez?, 72 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 558, 559 n.12 (1978); see also BENVENISTI, supra note 5, at 55 (“It
would make sense to regard the occupant as the responsible party.”).
144. UNCLOS, supra note 60, art. 76(1).
145. DINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 56.
146. See Lindsay Parson, Article 76, in LAW OF THE SEA COMMENTARY, supra note 135,
at 587, 592–93 (analyzing the relevant case law and State practice).
147. See Wolf, supra note 59, ¶ 2 (citations omitted)
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limited ‘sovereign rights’ over specific functional areas in the exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf, but these rights do not imply sovereignty over these areas.”148 It goes on to clarify, “in describing waters that
are not subject to the sovereignty of a state (e.g., the exclusive economic
zone and continental shelf, and high seas), the word ‘territory’ should not be
used.”149 Similarly, the U.K. Manual on the Law of Armed Conflict concludes:
[I]t is only internal waters and the territorial sea that together with the land
territories constitute the territory of a belligerent. Other zones of maritime
jurisdiction (eg [sic] continental shelf and exclusive economic zone) lying
beyond the limits of the territorial sea do not form a part of the territory
of the state.150

As such, the European Council has criticized the Turkish exploitation of
natural resources in the continental shelf of Northern Cyprus, by “strongly
condemn[ing] Turkey’s continued illegal actions in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea . . . and urgently call[ing] on Turkey to cease these
actions and respect the sovereign rights of Cyprus to explore and exploit its
natural resources.”151 Accordingly, in this author’s opinion, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf cannot be subjected to occupation.152
Similarly, the high seas may be not be placed under occupation. Although
in the past some authors have supported the opposite view, arguing that occupation of the high seas can exist in the form of blockade;153 this view is no
In internal waters, in the territorial sea and in archipelagic waters the coastal State exercises
sovereignty which is derived from its territorial sovereignty and the proximity to its coast;
these zones therefore form the maritime part of the coastal state’s territory. In contrast
thereto, other maritime zones do not form part of the coastal state’s territory and the coastal
state only exercises functional limited competences and is not granted sovereignty.

For more on this view, see YOSHIFUMI TANAKA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE
SEA 147–49 (2d ed. 2015).
148. U.S. LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 10, § 13.2.1.
149. Id.
150. See U.K. LOAC MANUAL, supra note 39, ¶13.6(a).
151. European Council, European Council Conclusions on the Western Balkans and
Actions by Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea, ¶¶ 12–13 (Mar. 22,
2018), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/03/22/europeancouncil-conclusions-on-the-western-balkans-and-actions-by-turkey-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-and-the-aegean-sea-22-march-2018/.
152. Cf. Singer, supra note 1, at 272–73 (arguing that the contiguous zone and the exclusive economic zone may be occupied).
153. For instance, one author has studied blockades and the use of sea mines under the
label of military occupation of the high sea. See Herbert Arthur Smith, Le Dévelopment Moderne
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longer persuasive. Indeed, if blockade and occupation were equated in the
law, there would be no reason to create blockade as a separate method of
naval warfare.154 Moreover, blockade is more comparable to siege than to
occupation.155 Today, most authorities are of the view that high seas areas
cannot be occupied. For example, according to Rolin, such an occupation
would be intrinsically contrary to the principle of freedom of seas.156
Further, under Article 89 of UNCLOS, “[n]o state may validly purport
to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty.”157 This provision
demonstrates that the high seas cannot be territory within the meaning of
Article 42 of the Hague Regulations. As Gerson observed, the concept of
high seas “by its very nature [is] not subject to belligerent occupation.”158
State practice supports this conclusion. For example, the United States finds
that “it is clear that high seas are not subject to belligerent occupation,”159
while the Netherlands concludes, “it is impossible to occupy positions on
the high seas.”160 Likewise, in its report on the Israeli boarding of the Mavi
Marmara, the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court
found that the passengers were not “‘in occupied territory’ since . . . the vessel [was] . . . on the high seas.”161
In sum, only the maritime territory over which a State exercises territorial
sovereignty—its internal waters, territorial sea, and archipelagic waters—are
included in the notion of occupied territory under Article 42 of the Hague
Regulations. If a belligerent State exercises actual authority over these areas
and adjacent portions of land territory, then the law of occupation applies.

des Lois de la Guerre Maritime, 63 RECUEIL DES COURS 601, 648–62 (1938). Lawrence takes a
more cautious position. See T. J. LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
435–36 (6th ed. 1917) (concluding “occupation on land is analogous to blockade at sea”)
(emphasis added).
154. For more on blockade, see infra notes 196–98 and accompanying text.
155. See Kraska, supra note 80, at 373. On sieges under international humanitarian law,
see, for example, EMANUELA-CHIARA GILLARD, CHATHAM HOUSE BRIEFING, SIEGES, THE
LAW AND PROTECTING CIVILIANS (2019).
156. ROLIN, supra note 109, at 282.
157. UNCLOS, supra note 60, art. 89.
158. Gerson, supra note 99, at 728 n.15.
159. U.S. Department of State, supra note 76.
160. NETHERLANDS MARITIME MILITARY DOCTRINE, supra note 67, at 83.
161. See Office of the Prosecutor, supra note 3, ¶ 44; see also MARTIN FINK, MARITIME
INTERCEPTION AND THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 234–36 (2018) (noting that it would
be erroneous to consider a vessel as occupied territory since vessels are not portions of
territory of their State of registration).
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THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF THE LAW OF OCCUPATION AT SEA

Having concluded that internal waters, the territorial sea, and archipelagic
waters are subject to occupation, it is important to assess the usefulness of
the law of occupation to govern occupied maritime territory as demonstrated
through State practice.
Although occupation has been described as “a natural phenomenon in
war,”162 international law considers situations of occupation as exceptional
circumstances in which it is necessary to allocate rights and responsibilities
beyond the normal order governing sovereign States.163 In doing so, the law
of occupation takes into account the different and conflicting interests at
stake. According to the U.S. Law of War Manual, the law of occupation involves “a complicated, trilateral set of legal relations between the occupying
power, the temporarily ousted sovereign authority, and the inhabitants of
occupied territory.”164 These different interests and legal regimes are reflected in the delicate balance between the hostile character of the occupation and the governmental-like authority given to the occupying State, which
has a duty to administer the occupied territory to ensure public order and
restore public life.165
The law of occupation is the only body of international law that requires
an extensive exercise of governmental functions by one State in the territory
of another State. In that territory, the occupying State may no longer use
force under international humanitarian law, but must maintain public order

162. DINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 1.
163. See Orna Ben-Naftali, Belligerent Occupation: A Plea for the Establishment of an International Supervisory Mechanism, in REALIZING UTOPIA: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
538, 540 (Antonio Cassese ed., 2012).
164. U.S. LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 10, § 11.4 (citing JULIUS STONE, LEGAL
CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 694 (1954)) (emphasis added); see also Charles
Garraway, Occupation Responsibilities and Constraints, in THE LEGITIMATE USE OF MILITARY
FORCE 263, 278 (Howard M. Hensel ed., 2008); Hans-Peter Gasser & Knut Dörmann, Protection of the Civilian Population, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW 231, 266 (Dieter Fleck ed., 3d ed. 2013). However, the law of occupation evolved so
that that today it comprises obligations erga omnes and erga omnes partes, which are relevant for
the international community as a whole and all the States parties to the Geneva Conventions. See Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 13, ¶¶ 155, 157; LONGOBARDO, supra note 3,
at 84–86.
165. See Hague Regulations, supra note 6, art. 43. For more on this, see LONGOBARDO,
supra note 3, at 169–76.
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through law enforcement means unless there is a resumption of hostilities.166
Moreover, unless the occupying power has invoked lawful derogation
clauses, international human rights law applies to the activities of the occupying power in the occupied territory.167 But the law of occupation is not
oblivious to the reality of the ongoing armed conflict in recognizing that
there may be violent resistance to the occupation. If such violent resistance
occurs, the occupying power can use military force in response if the violence is of sufficient intensity and duration to meet the threshold for a noninternational armed conflict.168 Accordingly, in cases of resumption of hostilities, the law of occupation allows the application of rules governing international armed conflict, including the rules on naval warfare.169
The law of occupation establishes a legal framework for the governance
of maritime territory during an armed conflict—including for the exploitation of natural resources170—when a State exercises actual authority over

166. For more details, see LONGOBARDO, supra note 3, at 186–94; see also Kenneth
Watkin, Maintaining Law and Order during Occupation: Breaking the Normative Chains, 41 ISRAEL
LAW REVIEW 175 (2008); Kenneth Watkin, Use of Force during Occupation: Law Enforcement and
Conduct of Hostilities, 94 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 267 (2012) [hereinafter Watkin, Use of Force].
167. See, e.g., Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 13, ¶ 106; Armed Activities, supra note
13, ¶ 216; see also Orna Ben-Naftali & Yuval Shany, Living in Denial: The Application of Human
Rights in the Occupied Territories, 37 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 17 (2004); YUTAKA ARAITAKAHASHI, THE LAW OF OCCUPATION: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW, AND ITS INTERACTION WITH INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
(2009); Noam Lubell, Human Rights Obligations in Military Occupation, 94 INTERNATIONAL
REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 317 (2012).
168. Louise Doswald-Beck, The Right to Life in Armed Conflict: Does International Humanitarian Law Provide All the Answers?, 88 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 881,
894 (2006); Marco Pertile, L’Adozione di Misure contro il Terrorismo nei Territori Occupati: I Poteri
e gli Obblighi Delle Potenze Occupanti, in LA TUTELA DEI DIRITTI UMANI NELLA LOTTA E
NELLA GUERRA AL TERRORISMO 295, 309 (Pietro Gargiulo & Maria Chiara Vitucci eds.,
2009); Watkin, Use of Force, supra note 166, at 291; LONGOBARDO, supra note 3, at 235–38.
169. On naval warfare rules as a portion of Hague Law, see Haines, supra note 70.
170. See generally Antonio Cassese, Powers and Duties of an Occupant in Relation to Land and
Natural Resources, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, supra note 9, at 419; Iain Scobbie, Natural Resources and Belligerent Occupation: Mutation Through Permanent Sovereignty, in HUMAN RIGHTS, SELF-DETERMINATION AND POLITICAL
CHANGE IN THE PALESTINIAN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 221 (Stephen Bowen ed., 1997);
Emanuele Cimiotta, Conflitto Armato Nella Repubblica Democratica del Congo e Principio Della Sovranità Permanente Degli Stati Sulle Proprie Risorse Naturali, in PROBLEMI E TENDENZE DEL
DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE DELL’ECONOMIA: LIBER AMICORUM IN ONORE DI PAOLO
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portions of the territorial sea, internal waters, and archipelagic waters of another State. The occupying power does not acquire ownership of public
goods and natural resources, rather, it has usufructuary rights;171 this means
that the occupying power may enjoy the fruits of public property to support
the costs of the occupation and protect the interests and needs of the local
population,172 but it is prevented from completely depleting it or alienating
the natural resources of the occupied territory.173
This rule could have been applied in determining Morocco’s fishing
rights in the waters of Western Sahara. Regrettably, the ECJ did not address
the status of the waters as occupied territory,174 having previously held that
the 2006 EU-Morocco Fisheries Partnership Agreement175 and its 2013 Protocol176 cannot be applied to the territorial waters and exclusive economic zone
of Western Sahara because to do so would conflict with the principle of selfdetermination of peoples.177 The Court also failed to identify the legal regime

PICONE 55 (Aldo Ligustro & Giorgio Sacerdoti eds., 2011); Marco Longobardo, The Palestinian Right to Exploit the Dead Sea Coastline for Tourism, 58 GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 317 (2015).
171. Hague Regulations, supra note 6, art. 55.
172. See Anicée van Engeland, Protection of Public Property, in THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 7, 1535, 1543.
173. See ERNST H. FEILCHENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 71 (1942); Cassese, supra note 170, at 428; van Engeland, supra note
172, at 1541–42; Longobardo, supra note 170, at 335.
174. Western Sahara Campaign UK, supra note 4, ¶ 72. On the characterization of Western Sahara as occupied territory, see Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic and Another v. Owner
and Charterers of the MV ‘NM Cherry Blossom’ and Others 2017 (5) SA 105 (ECP) at 11 para. 40
(S. Afr.); see also Christine Chinkin, Laws of Occupation, in MULTILATERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH WESTERN SAHARA AS A CASE STUDY 167 (Neville Botha, Michèle Olivier & Delarey van Tonder eds., 2010); BENVENISTI, supra note 5, at 171–72; Ben Saul, The
Status of Western Sahara as Occupied Territory under International Humanitarian Law and the Exploitation of Natural Resources, 27 GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SECURITY 301 (2015).
175. Council Regulation 764/2006 of May 22, 2006, on the Conclusion of the Fisheries
Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Morocco,
2006 O.J. (L 141/1), 4.
176. Protocol between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco Setting Out
the Fishing Opportunities and Financial Contribution Provided for in the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco, 2013 O.J. (L
328/2).
177. See supra note 4. These decisions have received considerable attention by legal
scholars. See, e.g., Eva Kassoti, Between Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit and Realpolitik: The EU and
Trade Agreements Covering Occupied Territories, 26 ITALIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 139 (2016); Enzo Cannizzaro, In Defence of Front Polisario: The ECJ as a Global Jus Cogens
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applicable to Moroccan activities in the maritime territory of Western Sahara.178 The Court should have considered the international customary law
of occupation,179 and, in this writer’s opinion, concluded that Morocco is
entitled to exploit the territory’s natural resources so long as it complies with
Article 55 of the Hague Regulations and other rules of the law of occupation
requiring the occupying power to employ the natural resources for the welfare of the local population.180
Another maritime area in which the law of occupation could be applied
is the territorial sea off the coast of the Gaza Strip since the international
community considers that Gaza’s land territory is under occupation.181 As
addressed above, in the 1990s Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization concluded various agreements that focused, inter alia, on the maintenance of public order at sea, the regulation of fishing rights, and external
defense of the Gazan coasts.182 These agreements cannot derogate from international humanitarian law in general and the law of occupation in particular. Under Article 7 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, “[n]o special agreement shall adversely affect the situation of protected persons, as defined by
the present Convention, nor restrict the rights which it confers upon
them.”183 Article 47 expressly addresses occupation providing,
Maker, 55 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 569 (2018); Pål Wrange, Self-Determination, Occupation and the Authority to Exploit Natural Resources: Trajectories from Four European Judgments on
Western Sahara, 52 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 3 (2019); Balingene Kahombo, The Western Sahara
Cases before the Court of Justice of the European Union and International Law, 18 CHINESE JOURNAL
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (forthcoming 2019).
178. On the different maritime areas established by Morocco as an occupying power
and by the representatives of the Saharawi people, see the very informative article by Jeffrey
Smith, International Law and Western Sahara’s Maritime Area, 50 OCEAN DEVELOPMENT &
INTERNATIONAL LAW 117 (2019).
179. On the applicability of customary international law within the EU legal order, see
generally ALESSANDRA GIANELLI, DIRITTO DELL’UNIONE EUROPEA E DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE CONSUETUDINARIO (2003); FEDERICO CASOLARI, L’INCORPORAZIONE DEL
DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE NELL’ORDINAMENTO DELL’UNIONE EUROPEA (2008); INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (Enzo Cannizzaro, Paolo Palchetti &
Ramses A. Wessel eds., 2011).
180. Earlier, Enrico Milano put this position forward. See Enrico Milano, The New Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Morocco: Fishing Too
South?, 22 ANUARIO ESPAÑOL DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 423, 448–49 (2006) (noting
that Milano’s argument relies solely on the application of the Hague Regulations, rather than
the entire law of occupation, coupled with the rules on non-self-governing territories).
181. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 74–84 and accompanying text.
183. GC IV, supra note 6, art. 7.
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[p]rotected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in
any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any change introduced, as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions or government of the said territory, nor by any
agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied territories
and the Occupying Power, nor by any annexation by the latter of the whole
or part of the occupied territory.184

Accordingly, the conventional rules on the governance of the territorial sea
off the Gaza Strip cannot derogate from the law of occupation, but, rather,
must be interpreted in a manner compatible with both the Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention.185
The application of the law of occupation to maritime territory is not a
panacea, particularly because its geographic scope extends only to internal
waters, the territorial sea, and archipelagic waters. Thus, even had the ECJ
chosen to address occupation in its Western Sahara decisions, it would have
only applied the law of occupation to the relatively small area of the territorial
sea. Similarly, the law of occupation does not regulate Turkish activities in
the area beyond the territorial sea of occupied Northern Cyprus. Thus, the
2018 Turkish decision to bar access to natural resources located in the continental shelf to the Italian vessel Saipan 12000 cannot be assessed under the
law of occupation.186
The inapplicability of the law of occupation does not leave exclusive economic zones and continental shelves without protection under international
law. Rather, protection comes from other branches of public international
law, such as the principle of self-determination and the law of the sea.
In conclusion, when there is the exercise of actual authority by a belligerent over portions of an enemy’s maritime territory, the law of occupation
can offer solutions to problems not addressed by the law of naval warfare.
However, because it is limited in its application to the territorial sea, internal
waters, and archipelagic waters, the law of occupation has no application to

184. Id. art. 47.
185. For further discussion, see Robert Kolb, Etude sur l’Occupation et sur l’Article 47 de la
IVeme Convention de Genève du 12 Août 1949 Relative à la Protection des Personnes Civiles en Temps
de Guerre: le Degré d’Intangibilité des Droits en Territoire Occupé, 10 AFRICAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 267 (2004).
186. For more on this incident, see Enrico Milano, Tensioni Diplomatiche nel Mediterraneo
Orientale: il Caso Saipem 12000, 51 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 553 (2018).
354

The Occupation of Maritime Territory

Vol. 95

exclusive economic zones and continental shelves, areas in which many of
the natural resources of the sea are found.
VII. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE LAW OF OCCUPATION AND THE LAW
OF NAVAL WARFARE
Although the law of occupation and the law of naval warfare generally regulate two distinctly different aspects of armed conflict, there may be times
that they seemingly regulate the same conduct, thus raising questions as to
the interplay between these two branches of international humanitarian law.
This Part explores this interplay, taking into account how different rules of
international humanitarian law usually interact.
First, it must be stressed that to consider the rules on naval warfare as
applying only to the sea and the law of occupation only to land is not only
erroneous—as demonstrated above, maritime territory may be occupied—
but it fails to recognize the reality of armed conflict. In that reality, the
boundaries between land and naval warfare are not always easy to assess because it is wrongfully assumed that hostilities are conducted exclusively either on land, on and under water, or in the air.
This belief has led to the development of different rules shaped specifically for these three realms, with States regulating the same conduct differently depending on whether it occurred on land, at sea, or in the air. The
most typical example is the seizure of private property, which is allowed by
the law of naval warfare but prohibited under the law of land warfare.187 Indeed, a century ago, the treatment of private property was one of the main
reasons cited for regulating naval and land warfare differently.188 However,
some commentators have denounced the artificial character of the distinction between naval and land warfare and noted the practical difficulties of
assessing whether conduct falls into one or the other area in certain circumstances.189 For instance, attack of an object on land from the sea may be seen
as an act of either naval or land warfare (or both).

187. On land, see Hague Regulations, supra note 6, arts. 46, 53; GC IV, supra note 6, art.
53. At sea, see SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED
CONFLICTS AT SEA, supra note 90, ¶¶ 135–52. See also the old, but still relevant article by
Manley O. Hudson, Seizures in Land and Naval Warfare Distinguished, 16 AMERICAN JOURNAL
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 375 (1922).
188. ROLIN, supra note 109, at 17.
189. See SERENI, supra note 99, at 1997–2000.
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Accordingly, there is a need for norms that regulate the scope of applications of the specific rules. In the example above of an object on land attacked from the sea, Article 49(3) of 1977 Additional Protocol I provides a
specific rule.190 This Article makes clear that its drafters did not unify the
rules on land and naval warfare; thus, there are circumstances where two
different sets of norms apply.191 It is, therefore, important to understand how
to reconcile normative conflicts when they arise.
The first step is to recognize that the law of occupation is open to the
application of other rules of international humanitarian law, as well as other
rules of public international law.192 Although the law of occupation is principally contained in the Hague Regulations, the Fourth Geneva, and Additional Protocol I, other international humanitarian law treaties contain rules
regarding the law of occupation, such those protecting cultural property.193
Similarly, when an armed confrontation occurs in occupied territory of sufficient intensity to be classified as a non-international armed conflict, then
the land warfare rules apply, even though they were not created to address
situations of occupation.194

190. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 49(3), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]; see generally ELMAR RAUCH, THE PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO
THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA:
REPERCUSSIONS ON THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE (1984).
191. AP I, supra note 190, art. 49(3)
The provisions of this Section apply to any land, air or sea warfare which may affect the
civilian population, individual civilians or civilian objects on land. They further apply to all
attacks from the sea or from the air against objectives on land but do not otherwise affect
the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict at sea or in the air.

See also Ashley Roach, The Law of Naval Warfare at the Turn of Two Centuries, 94 AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 64, 69 (2000) (“No treaty rules specifically make the
general principles of the law of war on land applicable to war at sea.”). But see SERENI, supra
note 99, at 1999–2000 arguing the contrary view).
192. For further discussion, see generally LONGOBARDO, supra note 3, at 47.
193. See Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict art. 5, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240; Protocol for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict art. 1, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 358; Second
Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict art. 9, Mar. 26, 1999, 2253 U.N.T.S. 172.
194. See LONGOBARDO, supra note 3, at 258–60. The one notable exception is the case
of a rule pertaining to the conduct of hostilities embodied in the law of occupation, which would
prevail over a more generic rule on the conduct of hostilities not specifically addressing
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By analogy, nothing precludes the application of the rules of naval warfare to a resumption of hostilities occurring in occupied maritime territory.
If hostilities resume, the law on naval warfare would govern them. Again,
the violence must be of sufficient intensity to meet the definition for a noninternational armed conflict. If it does not reach that level, the occupying
power is limited to the use of law enforcement measures to restore and ensure public order.
In applying this framework to the blockade of the Gaza Strip,195 the law
of occupation should not apply since the blockade was established beyond
the territorial sea. However, the blockade does have an impact on occupied
territory since its specific purpose is to prevent the transport of persons or
goods to the Gaza Strip. The question presented here is whether Israel was
entitled to enact the blockade, which is a method of warfare, under the law
of occupation.
The legality of blockade as a method of warfare is outside the scope of
the law of occupation and should be assessed under the law of blockade
itself.196 However, the law of occupation does, as discussed above, regulate
when is it possible to use of methods of warfare; accordingly, the resort to a
blockade to restore and ensure public order in occupied territory would be
lawful only to address situations of violence comparable to a non-international armed conflict.197 The alternate view, according to which a blockade
occupations based on the principle of lex specialis. See id. at 260–61. However, no special rule
on the conduct of hostilities at sea is embodied in the law of occupation.
195. For different views on this debate, see Kraska, supra note 80; Andrew Sanger, The
Contemporary Law of Blockade and the Gaza Freedom Flotilla, 13 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 397 (2010); Russel Buchan, The International Law of Naval Blockade and
Israel’s Interception of the Mavi Marmara, 58 NETHERLANDS INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
209 (2011); Douglas Guilfoyle, The Mavi Marmara Incident and Blockade in Armed Conflict, 81
BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 171 (2011).
196. On this topic, see SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO
ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA, supra note 90, ¶¶ 93–104; Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Blockade, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oct. 2015),
https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e2
52; PHILLIP DREW, THE LAW OF MARITIME BLOCKADE: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
(2018).
197. An U.N. panel accepted the Israeli assertion that the blockade was a lawful selfdefense measure. See U.N. Secretary-General Panel of Inquiry, Report on the Secretary-General’s
Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident, ¶ 72 (Sept. 2011). But for the argument
that the analysis should not be influenced by jus ad bellum considerations since jus ad bellum
“has no relevance” to the relationship between the occupying power and the occupied territory, see LONGOBARDO, supra note 3, at 126–33 (citing Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note
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established in the high seas is lawful irrespective of its effects on the occupied territory, ignores the fact that the blockade is directed against the occupied territory. This result would lead to the unsupportable conclusion that
an occupying power may lawfully resort to methods of warfare in the occupied territory beyond the limits set by the law of occupation as long as these
methods are operated from outside the occupied territory.198
In cases of apparent overlap between the law of occupation and the law
of naval warfare, a State must attempt to avoid the normative conflict
through interpretation, taking into account the law of occupation when interpreting the law on naval warfare and vice versa.199 The Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties codifies this requirement in Article 31(3)(c), under
which a treaty provision is to be interpreted in light of other “relevant rules
of international law.”200 However, in cases of normative conflict between
two sets of rules not resolved through interpretation, there is the need to
identify a rule that does so.
The Oxford Manual resolves possible normative conflict by stating,
“[r]ules peculiar to naval warfare are applicable only on the high seas and in
the territorial waters of the belligerents, exclusive of those waters which,
from the standpoint of navigation, ought not to be considered as maritime.”201 The original French text of the Manual employs the word “spéciales” instead of “peculiar,” thus framing the relationship between the rules
of naval warfare and the rules of land warfare as one of the prevalence of lex
specialis over lex generalis.202 Although this view enjoys some support among
scholars,203 it does not withstand scrutiny. If one conceives of international
humanitarian law as divided into three areas—the law of land warfare, the
13, ¶ 139). In fact, the security of the occupying power is one of the considerations for
resorting to means and methods of warfare under the law of occupation. See id. at 170–71.
198. The issue is so complex that Turkey has suggested that blockades of occupied
territories are inherently unlawful, without providing a sound argument to support this view.
See TURKISH NATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY, REPORT ON THE ISRAELI ATTACK ON
THE HUMANITARIAN AID CONVOY TO GAZA ON 31 MAY 2010, at 78–81 (2011).
199. See generally Michael Akehurst, The Hierarchy of the Sources of International Law, 47
BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 273, 275 (1975); JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 240–44 (2003).
200. On this provision, see generally PANOS MERKOURIS, ARTICLE 31(3)(C) VCLT AND
THE PRINCIPLE OF SYSTEMIC INTEGRATION (2013); GARDINER, supra note 31, at 289–346.
201. Oxford Manual, supra note 89, art. 1.
202. See Ronzitti, supra note 90, at 30. On the principle of lex specialis, see generally Right
of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), Judgment, 1960 I.C.J. Rep. 6, 44 (Apr. 12);
Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libya), Judgment, 1982 I.C.J. Rep. 18, ¶ 24 (Feb. 24).
203. See SERENI, supra note 99, at 2043; Ronzitti, supra note 90, at 30–31.
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law of naval warfare, and the law of aerial warfare—there is no reason to
consider one of them (land warfare) as general in relation to another one
(naval warfare), rather, they should be considered as distinct areas not subject
to the lex specialis/lex generalis analysis. Accordingly, it is necessary to find
other mechanisms to resolve normative conflicts.
Article 53(2) of the Hague Regulations provides one such mechanism,
stating:
[a]ll appliances, whether on land, at sea, or in the air, adapted for the transmission of news, or for the transport of persons or things, exclusive of cases
governed by naval law, depots of arms, and, generally, all kinds of munitions
of war, may be seized, even if they belong to private individuals, but must
be restored and compensation fixed when peace is made.204

Accordingly, the law of occupation on the seizure of means of maritime and
naval communications and transport is applicable only when not governed
by the “droit maritime.”205 Through this rule, the drafters of the Hague Regulations have avoided normative conflicts between the law of occupation
and the law of naval warfare in this one area by establishing that the law of
occupation pertaining to means of communication and transport controls
only if there is no other applicable rule of naval warfare. The contrary view
that this rule refers to domestic maritime law rather than to international law
pertaining to naval warfare, albeit authoritatively supported,206 is not persuasive. That interpretation subjects the international law regulation of the
means of communication and transport in occupied territory to domestic
law only at sea—a result without precedent in the law of war.
As evidence that Article 53(2) is a rule governing potential normative
conflicts between the law of occupation and the rules of naval warfare, case
law has recognized, based on this provision, the applicability of the rules of
naval warfare to the seizure of vessels in internal waters of occupied territory.207 The recognition that the law of naval warfare applies to the seizure
204. Hague Regulations, supra note 6, art. 53(2) (emphasis added).
205. This is the authoritative French expression employed in Article 53(2). See id.
206. See 4 GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 304–07 (1968).
207. See Cession of Vessels and Tugs for Navigation on the Danube (Czech., Greece,
Rom., Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom v. Austria, Bulg., Ger., Hung.), 1 R.I.A.A. 97, 105–08
(Perm Ct. Arb. 1921); see also GERHARD VON GLAHN, THE OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY: A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION
221 (1957).
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of vessels in internal waters instead of the law of occupation based on Article
53(2) is more persuasive than the abovementioned suggestion that this result
is the consequence of the principle of lex specialis. Although the case law addressed seizures occurring in rivers, Article 53(2) applies regardless of
whether the seizure occurs in other internal waters, the territorial sea, or archipelagic waters.
It is suggested here that the Article 53(2) rule should be interpreted as
applying to the entire relationship between the law of occupation and the
law of naval warfare, and not only to instances involving the seizure of means
of communications and transportation. Under this interpretation, if there
were an apparent normative conflict between the law of occupation and the
law of naval warfare concerning activities in occupied maritime territory, the
law of naval warfare would govern.
Finally, it should be noted that the different focuses of the law of occupation—principally concerned with the governance of occupied territory
and the protection of the interests of the ousted sovereign—and of the rules
of naval warfare—principally concerned with the means and methods of
warfare, as well as prize law and maritime neutrality—reduces the possibility
of normative conflicts. But, if a normative conflict does occur, we would
first turn to the interpretative methodology of Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT.
Only if the conflict still exists would the principle embodied in Article 53(2)
of the Hague Regulations favoring the rules on naval warfare be invoked.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

This article has demonstrated that the law of occupation extends to maritime
territory when a State both exercises actual authority over the maritime territory of another State and occupies a portion of the land territory of that
State. This conclusion is the result of the evolution of the concept of territory
under international law, which today encompasses the territorial sea, internal
waters, and archipelagic waters. The decision of a State to exercise actual
authority over portions of the maritime territory of another State without
the latter’s consent triggers the application of the law of occupation. Occupation burdens the occupying State with a number of obligations, in particular, the duty to maintain public order and protection of natural resources.
Currently, this legal framework applies to the occupation of maritime territories off the coast of Western Sahara and the Gaza Strip, and it was relevant
to other situations of occupation such as that of Iraq in 2003 and 2004.

360

The Occupation of Maritime Territory

Vol. 95

Applying the law of occupation to maritime territory fills a governance
gap by providing rules for activities not covered by the law of naval warfare
or any other source of international humanitarian law. However, the law of
occupation does not extend to conduct occurring outside the sovereign maritime territory of an occupied State, that is, on the continental shelf, in the
exclusive economic zone, or on the high seas.
The law of occupation recognizes that at times other international humanitarian law rules may apply in occupied maritime territory, in particular,
the law of naval warfare if there is a resumption of hostilities. In those instances, the rules of treaty interpretation should be used to resolve apparent
conflicts between the law of occupation and the law of naval warfare. If this
does not resolve the conflict, the law of naval warfare should prevail because
of the principle embodied in Article 52(3) of the Hague Regulations.
The law of occupation is a powerful tool to govern conduct at sea in
those areas subject to its application, doing so in a manner that supports the
security needs of belligerent States and the welfare of the local population.
Accordingly, national and international courts and tribunals should be more
willing to apply the law of occupation to maritime territory, as the ECJ
should have done in its Western Sahara decisions.
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